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It was found in the instant case, upon construing the language of the con-
tract, that the parties intended a trust relationship to exist, the decision being
based upon the rules set forth in the pass book to the effect (1) that the de-
posits were to be invested in approved securities which were to be kept
separate from all other assets of the company and treated as a special fund,
(2) that the company was to keep in the special fund a total of securities and
cash equal to the total savings investments; and (3) that the depositors were
to be paid only out of the separate assets of the fund and not out of the other
funds of the depositary. The court's decision may well be questioned, how-
ever, when it is considered that the contract also provided (1) that 53/2o
interest was to be paid to the depositors; (2) that all earnings of the fund
were to go to the company and not to the depositors; and (3) that with-
drawals would be paid on demand, unless the bank saw fit to invoke the
statutory notice requirements. While the payment of interest is not conclusive
proof of a debtor-creditor relationship, it is one of the strongest indicia that
a loan and not a trust was intended. 2 4 This presumption is strengthened in
the instant case by the fact that the bank was to be entitled to the earnings
of the fund, which fact is certainly inconsistent with a finding that a fiduciary
relationship was intended. Further, it has been held that when a depositor
has the right to withdraw from his account for all purposes, as here, such
account shall be deemed a general deposit, title thereto passing to the bank.2 5
The reservation of the right to invoke the statutory notice requirements on
withdrawals would also seem to indicate that a debtor-creditor relationship
was intended, as the savings investment depositors were thereby placed in the
same class as the ordinary savings depositor in this respect.
When, however, the contract is viewed in the light of the later acts of the
parties, the court's finding that it was the intention of the bank that a
fiduciary relationship be created becomes even more untenable. From the date
of origin of the plan until the bank closed, the company commingled the savings
investment deposits with its general funds. This action is consistent only with
an understanding by the bank that these deposits were general in character.
Further, while the funds were so commingled, and before the notes were banded,
it would have been impossible for the depositors, as cestuis, to bear the losses
to the savings investment fund, as there was no such fund in existence. An-
other fact which evidences an understanding by the bank that the deposits
were general is that, if at any time while the funds were commingled, sufficient
cash had been segregated to establish a fund to repay the savings depositors
in full, the bank would have fallen below the statutory requirements as to
cash reserves. Thus it would seem that one party to the contract, namely the
depositary, at no time considered the depositors to be other than general
creditors, despite the court's finding to the contrary. M. E. W
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-PEDDLER.-The town of
Sellersburg passed an ordinance levying a license tax of twenty-five dollars per
year on peddlers and hawkers. The defendant was arrested and charged with
peddling without having procured a license. The defendant was employed
24 Cline v. Union Trust Co. (1934), 99 Ind. App. 296, 189 N. E. 643, 647,
Mo. etc. v. Holland Banking Co. (1927), 290 S. W 101, 103, Old Colony v.
Puritan (1923), 244 Mass. 259, 138 N. E. 321, 323.
25 In re North Missouri Trust Co. (1931), 39 S. W. (2nd) 412.
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by the Louisville store of the Great American Tea Company. His duties
were to take orders for the products of the tea company in Sellersburg and
other Indiana towns and forward the orders to the Louisville store. There the
orders were put up in the proper sized packages for delivery. Some two weeks
later the defendant called for these packages and, in a truck furnished by the
tea company, delivered the orders across the Indiana line to the vendees in
Sellersburg. The lower court found that the defendant was engaged in inter-
state commerce, and therefore could not be required to procure a license.
Held, that the defendant was engaged in intrastate commerce, and was there-
fore subject to the tax.1
A state cannot directly regulate or burden interstate commerce. 2 It has
been held that a tax imposed upon drummers for the privilege of soliciting
orders within the state for tangible goods to be shipped from without the
state directly to the purchaser is such a burden or regulation.a A state cannot
avoid this rule by defining peddlers so as to inclilde persons taking orders for
future shipment into the state or so as to include persons delivering goods
pursuant to such orders. Thus, if the foreign manufacturer delivers in his
own trucks, 4 or ships to an agent within the state, to be sorted and delivered
by such agent,5 no tax can be imposed. The defendant relies upon these
established rules of law to escape the tax in the instant case. His contention
is that he is an agent of the tea company, a foreign corporation, and that his
business consists of taking orders for future delivery by the tea company, and
in acting as agent for the tea company in delivering such orders. His argu-
ment prevailed in the lower court and there is much authority to support
him in cases involving almost identical facts.O
But the upper court decides that the defendant is engaged in peddling,
which is generally considered to be intrastate commerce and subject to direct
regulation by the states.7" To support its holding, the court relies upon the
fact that the tea company did not deal directly with the purchasers in Indiana,
but dealt with the defendant, relying upon him for payment for all goods sold.
From this, the court determines that defendant became the owner of the goods
in bulk when he received them at the office of the tea company in Kentucky, 8
and was therefore peddling his own goods in his own behalf. It is difficult
to follow the court in its conclusion that if defendant became the owner of
the goods in bulk when he received them at the office of the tea company in
Kentucky, that "it necessarily follows that he solicited purchasers of his own
1 Town of Sellersburg v. Stanforth (1935), - Ind. -, 198 N. E. 437.
2 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District (1887), 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. Ed.
694; Brennan v. Titusville (1894), 153 U. S. 289, 38 L. Ed. 719.
3 McLaughlin v. City of South Bend (1890), 126 Ind. 471, 26 N. E. 185;
Purchase v. State (1922), 109 Neb. 457, 191 N. W 677, Wilk v. City of Partow
(1923), 86 Fla. 186, 97 So. 307, Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland (1925), 286
U. S. 325, 69 L. Ed. 982.
4 Wagner v. City of Covington (1919), 251 U. S. 95, 64 L. Ed. 157.
5 Caldwell v. North Carolina (1903), 187 U. S. 622, 47 L. Ed. 336.
6 Hewson v. Inhabitants of Englewood (1893), 55 N. J. Law 522, 27 A.
904-; Jewel Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit (1911), 189 Fed. 280; Grand Union Tea
Co. v. Evans (1914), 216 Fed. 791, City of Anniston v. Jewel Tea Co. (1920),
18 Ala. App. 4, 88 So. 351.
7 Willis, Constittuional Law (1936), P 294, and cases there cited.
8 See Grand Union Tea Co. v. Evans (1914), 216 Fed. 791, for a case
involving similar facts in which the court reached an opposite conclusion.
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goods and was conducting a strictly intrastate business as a peddler" This
conclusion is difficult to follow because the goods were purchased after the
orders were taken. The fact that defendant subsequently purchased the goods
in Kentucky could not affect the interstate character of the prior solicitations
of the orders for the goods in Indiana.9 And if he did become the owner,
the transportation and delivery of the goods from Kentucky to Indiana waq
interstate commerce. 10
But apparently the court does not rely entirely upon the fact that defendant
became the owner of the goods, because it determines that the tea company,
and therefore defendant, was engaged in peddling in Indiana, even if it be
conceded that defendant was the agent of the tea company throughout the
entire transaction. No rationalization for this position is given. To support
this position the court cites International Harvester Co. q. Kentucky,11 which
held that the Harvester Co. was so engaged in doing business in Kentucky as
to be subject to service of process. But, since doing business for purposes of
service of process is different from doing business for purposes of taxation,1 2
little help is given by this case.
Because of this confusion, it is believed that one must look elsewhere for
an explanation of this decision. This explanation apparently is found in the
fact that a state has a social interest in the regulation of peddling which is
just as great when the soliciting of the order and the delivery are separated
in time, as it is when the sale and delivery are made simultaneously.13 States
can indirectly regulate interstate commerce when necessary to protect some
general social interest of the people of the state.1 4 It is believed that such
a regulation of peddling as was attempted in the instant case falls within this
rule. In a recent Supreme Court case, a merchant, located and operating in
Illinois, sold produce forwarded to him from outside the state. He objected
9 The test seems to depend entirely upon whether or not the goods were
in the state at the time of the sale. Wilcox v. People (1904), 46 Colo. 382,
104 P 408, Roselle v. Commonwealth (1909), 110 Va. 235, 65 S. E. 526;
American Amusement Co. v. East Lake Chutes Co. (1911), 174 Ala. 526, 56
So. 961, S. F Bowser and Co. v. Schwarz (1913), 152 Wis. 408, 140 N. W. 51,
Wilk v. City of Bartow (1923), 86 Fla. 186, 97 So. 307.
10 Commonwealth v. Ober (1853), 66 Mass. 493, In re Spain (1891), 47
Fed. 208; Hewson v. Inhabitants of Englewood (1893), 55 N. J. Law 522,
27 A. 904, Calwell v. North Carolina (1903), 187 U. S. 622, 47 L. Ed. 336.
As said by the court in In re Spain: "It is idle to say that a non-resident
may send drummers or persons to solicit sales in a sister state, but that the
state may tax him for making deliveries of the goods sold."
11 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (1914), 234 U. S. 579, 34 St.
Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479.
12 Willis, Constitutional Law (1936), p. 295.
13No better expression of this interest could be found than that of the
court in the instant case: "But the objections to peddling are no less real
when the peddler solicits orders and later returns to deliver the goods for
which he has taken orders. There is the same objectionable use of public
highways and homes of prospective purchasers for a place of business; the
same unbidden and frequently forced and disturbing intrusions into the private
homes; and the same viciously unfair competition with local merchants whose
business is a necessary element in the community life."
14Willis, Constitutional Law (1936), p. 309; Plumley v. Massachusetts
(1894), 165 U. S. 461, 39 L. Ed. 223, Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Public Service
of Indiana (1916), 242 U. S. 255, 61 L. Ed. 276, Buck v. Kuykendall (1925),
267 U. S. 307, 69 L. Ed. 623.
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to paying a license tax and to posting a bond as was required by an Illinois
statute. The United States Supreme Court said, "The sole question presented
is the constitutional validity of the act as it affects the appellant's liability
under its bonds. The statute is a police regulation. The business regulated
is local, having its situs within the state and being conducted therein. The
fact that the commission merchant contracts to sell, and sells, farm produce
forwarded to him from points without, as well as from points within, the state
is not enough to condemn the regulation of business carried on within her
borders. Such effect as the regulation has upon interstate commerce is indirect
and incidental and does not trespass upon the power conferred on Congress
by Article I, Section 8, of the Federal Constitution."1 5 Obviously, the Supreme
Court believes that in some instances the requirement of a license and the
posting of a bond only indirectly and incidentally affects interstate commerce.
It is submitted that this case indicates that the proper rationalization for
upholding the ordinance involved in the instant case, is that it operated as an
indirect regulation of interstate commerce under the state's police power.1 6
S. H.
STATUTES--TITLE-SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NON-RESIDENT MOTORLSrs.-Action
by appellee against appellant to recover damages occasioned by an automobile
collision. Appellant is a nonresident of the State of Indiana and service of
process was had upon the treasurer of state (secretary of state) under the
provision of chapter 179, sec. 15, Acts 1931. By special appearance appellant
moved to set aside the service and quash the return indorsed on the summons
on the ground that he was not a resident of Indiana and was not personally
served with summons. Appellant appeals from judgment for appellee, con-
tending the provision of chapter 179, sec. 15, Acts of 1931, to be unconstitu-
tional as in violation of sec. 19, article 4 of the Indiana Constitution which
provides, "Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly con-
nected therewith; which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any
subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title,
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in
the title." The title to the act in question is "An act concerning the financial
responsibility of owners and operators of motor vehicles for damages caused
by the operation of motor vehicles on public highways." Held, the provision
authorizing service of process upon the treasurer of state as agent for a
nonresident operator of motor vehicles is within the title of the act announc-
ing that the act has to do with the financial responsibility of owners and
operators of motor vehicles for damages caused by the operation of motor
vehicles on the public highways.1
The interpretation of the Constitutional limitation upon legislative action,
that the title to an act shall express the subject of the act and that every act
shall have but one subject, is well settled in the United States and Indiana.
The great weight of authority holds such constitutional provisions to be satis-
15 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. People of State of Ill. (1936),
56 S. Ct. 685.
16See Gavit, The Commerce Clause (1932), p. 40; Haines, Federal Re-
straints on the States' Power to Regulate House to House Selling (1934), 6
Rocky Mountain Law Rev. 85.
1 Herman v. Dransfield (1936), 200 N. E. 612.
